Bridging gaps in cross-cutting media exposure: the role of public service broadcasting by Castro Herrero, Laia et al.
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2018
Bridging gaps in cross-cutting media exposure: the role of public service
broadcasting
Castro Herrero, Laia; Skovsgaard, Morten; Nir, Lilach
Abstract: Previous studies show that individual political interest is an antecedent of news media ex-
posure, particularly of exposure to differing views. Nevertheless, little is known about this effect from
a comparative perspective: How do media institutions affect the relationship between political interest
and exposure to cross-cutting viewpoints? One institutional feature that varies between countries is
the ownership of broadcast media. This study investigates the extent to which the relative dominance
of public service broadcasting alters the relationship between political interest and non-like-minded, or
cross-cutting, news media exposure across 27 European Union countries. The analyses employ survey
data from 27,079 individuals and media content from 48,983 news stories. The results confirm that the
extent to which political interest contributes to cross-cutting exposure is contingent on the strength of
public service broadcasting. The stronger the broadcaster, the smaller the gaps between the most and
least politically engaged individuals.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2018.1476424
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-170589
Journal Article
Accepted Version
Originally published at:
Castro Herrero, Laia; Skovsgaard, Morten; Nir, Lilach (2018). Bridging gaps in cross-cutting media
exposure: the role of public service broadcasting. Political Communication, 35(4):542-565.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2018.1476424
Bridging Gaps in Cross-Cutting Media Exposure: 
The Role of Public Service Broadcasting 
 
 
Abstract 
Previous studies show that individual political interest is an antecedent of news media 
exposure, particularly of exposure to differing views. Nevertheless, little is known about this 
effect from a comparative perspective: how do media institutions affect the relationship 
between political interest and exposure to cross-cutting viewpoints? One institutional feature 
that varies between countries is the ownership of broadcast media. This study investigates the 
extent to which the relative dominance of public service broadcasting alters the relationship 
between political interest and non-likeminded, or cross-cutting news media exposure across 
27 EU countries. The analyses employ survey data from 27,079 individuals and media 
content from 48,983 news stories. The results confirm that the extent to which political 
interest contributes to cross-cutting exposure is contingent on the strength of public service 
broadcasting. The stronger the broadcaster, the smaller the gaps between the most and least 
politically engaged individuals.  
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   Bridging Gaps in Cross-Cutting Media Exposure: 
The Role of Public Service Broadcasting 
The quality of democracy is often estimated by the extent to which citizens are 
enabled to hear the other side. Ideal deliberative democracies, political theorists argue, 
should facilitate inclusive discussions among free and equal individuals, whose public 
discursive exchanges would allow the stronger argument to predominate and lead to agreed-
upon decision making (Guttman & Thompson, 2009; Habermas, 1984). Given the difficulties 
of complying with such procedural ideals, a more pragmatic notion of deliberativeness 
demands that citizens are regularly exposed to viewpoints opposed to their own.  
The benefits of frequent cross-cutting exposure are manifold. As Mutz (2006) notes, 
non-likeminded, or cross-cutting information provides for greater awareness of one’s own 
and others’ political perspectives and adds to political tolerance among citizens from all 
social backgrounds and credos. Being able to understand different political views is 
ultimately the foundation for discussing pressing issues and reaching political compromises 
widely perceived as legitimate (e.g., Mutz & Young, 2011). 
 In highly mediated democracies the news media are important sources of political 
information and for challenging political perspectives. With the shift from a low-choice to a 
high-choice media environment, individual motivation has become an increasingly important 
predictor of media use. As a consequence, the gap in news exposure between the most and 
the least politically interested has increased over time (e.g., Prior, 2007; Strömbäck, Djerf-
Pierre, & Shehata, 2013). A similar trend can be expected for cross-cutting media exposure, 
as political interest has also been shown to play a major role in exposure to non-likeminded 
information and deliberation skills (Garrett, 2009; Price, Cappella, & Nir, 2002). Gaps in 
cross-cutting exposure are problematic for democracy, since the benefits (political tolerance, 
awareness of multiple views) are only reaped by highly motivated individuals. 
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Recent research indicates that the opportunity structure provided by the media 
environments within which one is embedded moderates the effect of individual motivation 
(e.g., Nir, 2012b; Shehata & Strömbäck, 2011; Skovsgaard, Shehata, & Strömbäck, 2016). In 
other words, whether or not cross-cutting exposure occurs does not solely depend on the 
individual will to seek oppositional views and entertain disagreement, but also on the supply 
of—and thereby the opportunities to encounter—diverse viewpoints in the media 
environment (Mutz & Martin, 2001).  
We argue that an institutional feature of media markets, namely the presence of public 
service broadcasting (PSB), equalizes opportunities for cross-cutting exposure. In countries 
with stronger public service broadcasters (PSBs), the supply of news is larger, particularly 
during prime time (e.g., Esser et al., 2012), and the news coverage is expected to reflect an 
obligation to be politically balanced and to present diverging perspectives (Hallin & Mancini, 
2004; McQuail, 1992). In addition, previous research has found a spill-over effect of 
standards from public service broadcasting to other media in the same market (Pfetsch, 1996; 
Reinemann, Stanyer, & Scherr, 2017). The result is that media environments characterized by 
strong public service broadcasting minimize the possibility of avoiding cross-cutting news 
and make unintentional cross-cutting media exposure more likely. Thus, in media systems 
with strong public service broadcasting, personal political interest can be expected to be a 
less important predictor of cross-cutting media exposure than in media systems with weaker 
public service broadcasting. 
Our analysis capitalizes on the differing strength of public service broadcasting across 
European Union member states, and relies on survey and content data on the European 
Election Study 2009 from 27 European Union (EU) countries. Our findings indicate that, in 
countries with strong public service broadcasting, there are smaller differences in cross-
cutting exposure between individuals who are more and less politically interested; 
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conversely, in countries with weak public service broadcasting, there are wider gaps in cross-
cutting exposure. 
Theoretical Review and Hypotheses 
 Cross-cutting exposure has been defined as the extent to which citizens are 
“exposed to political perspectives that they do not find agreeable” (Goldman & Mutz, 2011, 
p. 42). The concept has important implications for the quality of democracy because it is 
associated with greater tolerance (Mutz, 2002a), legitimacy, and satisfaction with the system 
and its outcomes (Esterling, Fung, & Lee, 2015); political knowledge with the outlook of 
future interactions (Eveland, 2004); argument repertoire in support of opposing viewpoints 
(Price et al., 2002); and has mobilizing effects (Nir, 2011). Cross-cutting exposure gaps 
between individuals with different motivations and attitudes have further normative 
ramifications. Such gaps create asymmetries in citizens’ ability and will to reach political 
consensus, and to competently influence political processes. As traditional studies on public 
policy tell us, an unequal distribution of political power poses a serious threat to effective 
democratic governance (Downs, 1957; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). 
 Despite its relevance and the wide array of studies dealing with individual 
determinants and the increasing opportunities provided by current media markets to self-
select political information (e.g., Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013; Levendusky, 2013; Mutz & 
Young, 2011; Prior, 2007; Stroud, 2008, 2011), the mechanisms through which people 
engage in cross-cutting media exposure have been much less researched, with a few notable 
exceptions (i.e., Garrett, 2009; Garrett & Stroud, 2014; Goldman & Mutz, 2011; Mutz & 
Martin, 2001). 
Political Interest and Cross-Cutting Exposure 
 Political interest is an important antecedent of news media exposure (Strömbäck & 
Shehata, 2010). It has also been shown to increase political knowledge (Delli Carpini & 
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Keeter, 1996) and attentiveness to political phenomena (Lupia & Philpot, 2005). We argue 
that political interest also increases cross-cutting media exposure. 
 One reason is that some individuals like to think of themselves as well-informed and 
fair-minded citizens (Garrett, 2009). Some even consider learning about competing political 
options to be their democratic duty (Hamilton, 2004). Thus, staying attuned to alternative 
viewpoints rather than avoiding them satisfies the perceived self-image of those more 
politically interested and engaged individuals. Engaging in rebutting oppositional arguments 
can even be emotionally gratifying (Westen, Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, & Hamann, 2006). 
Indeed, when politically sophisticated individuals are exposed to attitude-discrepant 
information they engage more in counter-arguing the information than in bolstering attitude-
consistent information; this is not the case for the less politically sophisticated (Taber & 
Lodge, 2006).  
In addition to these internal psychological incentives, the politically interested also 
have a social reason to seek counter-attitudinal perspectives: they aim to pass information on 
to others and thus be socially influential (Chaffee, 1982). Political interest is actually a well-
established predictor of engagement in political discussion (e.g., Kim, Wyatt, & Katz, 1999; 
Pan, Shen, Paek, & Sun, 2006). In particular, the more politically interested are more likely to 
seek political networks based on the expertise of their discussants (Huckfeldt, 2001) rather 
than on family ties and friendship, which in turn makes their discussions more politically 
heterogeneous (Klofstad, McClurg, & Rolfe, 2009). However, in general, one cannot be 
influential among peers without being able to anticipate oppositional arguments and rebut 
them. More politically interested citizens therefore have stronger incentives to learn opposing 
perspectives in preparation for future social exchanges (e.g., McLeod & McDonald, 1985). 
Following the psychological and societal mechanisms accounting for cross-cutting 
exposure, it makes sense that the more politically interested show greater deliberative skills 
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and abilities to understand others’ reasons (Price et al., 2002). They are not only better at 
processing congruent information that easily comes to mind (Taber & Lodge, 2006), but are 
also stronger at recalling uncongenial messages (Eagly, Kulesa, Brannon, Shaw, & Hutson-
Comeaux, 2000).  
 In summary, political interest makes citizens seek and call to mind cross-cutting 
viewpoints. Not only is this emotionally gratifying and consistent with their perceived self-
image, but being well-motivated and informed enables these politically interested individuals 
to refill their cognitive chambers with new ammunition for forthcoming political discussions. 
Based on these arguments, our first expectation is: 
H1: Political interest is positively linked to cross-cutting media exposure (or XME). 
Public Service Broadcasting as a Contextual Moderator 
Levels of political interest in Europe remain low (albeit with important differences 
between countries) (Van Deth & Elff, 2001), especially among “economically 
disadvantaged” groups (Oskarson, 2007, as cited in Strömbäck & Shehata, 2010, p. 576). 
This is noteworthy because if a great number of citizens with low political interest avoid 
exposure to cross-cutting views, society as a whole risks losing mutual understanding at a 
sufficiently high level necessary to discuss and reach political compromises (Mutz & Young, 
2011).  
An individual’s exposure to cross-cutting information cannot be explained solely by 
individual motivation; one’s opportunities to find media content also matter. To paraphrase 
Luskin (1990, pp. 334–335), Bedouins in Sahara do not become champion swimmers, 
regardless of their motivation; by the same logic, it is no coincidence that the best alpine 
skiers are from countries with snow-covered mountains. Thus, the opportunity structure 
provided by a given media market, i.e., the availability of different content and how easily 
citizens can select and avoid information in line with their preferences, also matter for 
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explaining differences in individual media exposure (e.g., Althaus, Cizmar & Gimpel, 2009; 
Skovsgaard et al., 2016).  
Previous research offers two relevant perspectives on how media environments affect 
media consumption gaps. On the one hand, a strand of literature shows that high media 
choice bolsters the role of individual motivations and abilities in news exposure or political 
knowledge (Jerit, Barabas, & Bolsen, 2006; Prior, 2007). On the other hand, studies using 
European cross-national data provide evidence of the equalizing character of inclusive media 
markets whose reach extends beyond elites. Certain institutional features of media can 
broaden information reach and thus potentially level the political playing field. For example, 
a less fragmented media environment is associated with a narrower gap in political 
engagement between individuals from different socio-economic strata (Nir, 2012b). Greater 
newspaper centrism narrows the gap in newspaper reading between the less and more 
politically interested and knowledgeable (Shehata & Strömbäck, 2011). A dominant PSB 
bridges knowledge gaps between the more and less politically interested (Iyengar et al., 
2010).  
 In line with Iyengar et al. (2010), we argue that PSB plays an essential role in 
spreading and equalizing exposure to political news—and in our case, cross-cutting news 
media exposure—and moderates the impact of political interest on non-likeminded media 
exposure. We elaborate on three reasons below: the institutional commitment of PSB, its 
spill-over effects on commercial media, and its contribution to media supply integration. 
Firstly, in countries with strong PSB the supply of news is larger, particularly during 
peak hours, during which the less interested are more likely to encounter news as a by-
product of watching prime-time television rather than because of an active choice to tune into 
a news broadcast (e.g., Aalberg & Curran, 2012; Esser et al., 2012; Iyengar et al., 2010). 
Indeed, the less politically interested viewers of public service television gain more political 
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knowledge (i.e., have a steeper learning curve) than the more politically interested (Shehata, 
Hopmann, Nord & Höijer, 2015). PSB can be expected to have the same levelling effect on 
cross-cutting exposure. Political balance and representativeness are hallmarks of PSB—
especially concerning news coverage and current affairs programming (McQuail, 1992). In 
combination with the substantial supply of news—also during prime time—the obligation to 
present opposing perspectives is conducive to cross-cutting media exposure, not only among 
the more politically interested, but also among the less politically interested who ‘just happen 
to’ watch the news. 
Secondly, previous research reports spill-over effects of PSB standards on commercial 
television channels (Pfetsch, 1996). A study of 16 Western democracies confirms such effect 
and concludes that it is correlated with the strength of PSB in the national market. The 
stronger the PSB, the more other media adapt the PSB standards for reporting political 
information (Reinemann, Stanyer, & Scherr, 2017). To the extent that PSB is successful in 
setting common patterns and routines in news coverage, this spill-over provides additional 
opportunities for cross-cutting exposure when consuming news in general. 
 Thirdly, the more dominant a PSB within a media market, the smaller the remaining 
portion of the media market. The consequence is less choice for the individual media 
consumer and, by extension, less selectivity and audience fragmentation along partisan lines. 
Thus, media systems with stronger PSB offer more opportunities to encounter non-
likeminded information by coincidence, and make avoiding cross-cutting exposure a much 
more difficult task.  
 Previous studies show that, overall, media systems in Northern, Southern and Central-
Eastern European countries are characterized by different levels of PSB popularity 
(Brüggemann, Engesser, Büchel, Humprecht, & Castro, 2014; Hallin & Mancini, 2004). 
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European countries are therefore fertile environments for testing how different media 
contexts make individual differences less crucial for cross-cutting exposure.  
To summarize, past research indicates that political interest equips citizens with 
motivation and knowledge to seek oppositional media perspectives. This exposure allows 
them to competently counter-argue others’ political views and satisfy their self-image as fair-
minded individuals. Yet, cross-national research on news consumption patterns reveals that 
inclusive media markets familiarize citizens with political diversity and reduce the 
importance of individual characteristics and motivations for media usage habits. We therefore 
formulate the following hypotheses: 
H2: Public service broadcasting is positively associated with XME.  
H3: The stronger PSB, the weaker the positive relationship between political interest and 
XME.  
Data and Methods 
To empirically test our hypotheses, we rely on survey data and media content from 27 
EU member states, collected by the European Parliament Election Study 2009 (EES). The 
EES 2009 offers an unprecedented set of codes and questions that enabled us to both uncover 
the political tone of the main media outlets across Europe, and analyze the media 
consumption patterns and political attitudes of more than 27,000 individuals throughout the 
region. Both the EES voter survey and media content are based on the same election (2009 
EU elections) and therefore hold equivalent data across countries. The countries considered 
are Austria, Belgium (Flanders and Wallonia), Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Cyprus, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, 
Sweden, and the UK.  
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The EES voter survey contains data on the political attitudes and media use of 27,079 
EU citizens from 27 member states collected during the three weeks following the June 2009 
European Parliament elections. The sample size per country ranges from 1,000 to 1,020 cases 
(within Belgium, N=529 for Flanders and N=473 for Wallonia). Adults aged 18+ years were 
interviewed either by telephone or face-to-face, using a standardized questionnaire. The 
average response rate across modes is 28.4 percent (AAPOR RR1), and varies from 10.9 per 
cent (Netherlands) to 60.3 per cent (Bulgaria). Appendix A contains the question wording for 
each variable used.  
 The EES media study includes information on media outlets’ coverage, taken from 
48,983 news stories across TV channels and newspapers of 27 member states. The data were 
collected during the June 2009 European election campaign (14 May- 4 June for some 
countries, up to 17 May- 7 June for others). The EES content analysis allows us to assess the 
political skew of three leading newspapers and two major television news programs in each 
media system, except for Germany (where information was available on four television 
channels) and Spain (three television channels). More specifically, we utilized 3,390 news 
evaluations on the national government’s record in the 27 EU countries considered, except 
for Denmark (evaluations of one newspaper were missing) and the Netherlands (data for one 
TV news channel was not available). 1 
We draw on random-intercept regression models, using individual exposure to cross-
cutting information as the dependent variable. These models allow us to both account for the 
hierarchical structure of our data by decomposing individual and country-level variances, and 
also to explain the relationship between cross-cutting news media exposure and our main 
independent variable of theoretical interest, namely political interest, considering contextual 
interactions (i.e., with public service broadcasting strength).2 
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Dependent variable. To operationalize cross-cutting news media exposure we rely on 
a measure that accounts for the distance between an individual’s stated political preferences 
and the political stand of his/her media diet. That is, we calculate the distance between his/her 
evaluation of the national government’s record, and the average evaluation found in news 
stories of the outlets he/she encounters on a weekly basis. We first build a variable that 
accounts for the extent to which an individual approves (1) or disapproves (-1) the 
government’s performance to date. Secondly, we calculate the mean of each national 
government’s positive (1), balanced/mixed (0), or negative (-1) evaluations found in each 
outlet’s news stories. Lastly, we calculate the absolute difference between each individual’s 
approval of their government and the average degree for each media outlet this individual 
uses at least once a week, averaged by the number of news media outlets they follow (see 
Appendix B for the formula and how scores are calculated for each individual and media 
outlet). The measure ranges from 0 to 2, where 0 represents non-exposure to cross-cutting 
viewpoints, 1 is moderate levels, and 2 is the highest degree of exposure to cross-cutting 
information (descriptive statistics and a variance-covariance matrix of the variables used can 
be found in Appendix C).3 The use of governmental evaluations to measure cross-cutting 
exposure is an informative heuristic that allows us to investigate people’s and media’s stand 
on a general ideological outlook. It provides generalizable results across different countries 
and sidesteps potential problems linked to other operationalizations, such as diverse 
conceptions of “left” and “right” between Central-Eastern Europe and Western Europe, 
difficulties to set cut-off points between categories and ideological labels, relative differences 
in political polarization, party-issue ownership and party segmentation, or higher or lower 
saliency and competition of different political dimensions. 
Independent variables. Political interest is our main independent variable of 
theoretical interest. EES respondents were asked the extent to which they were interested in 
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politics, with responses categorized from “Not at all” (1) to “Very interested” (4). Since we 
hypothesize that the relationship between political interest and cross-cutting news media 
exposure will be moderated by the strength of PSB, the latter is included in our regression 
models, both as a stand-alone independent variable and as an interaction with political 
interest. The strength of each country’s PSB is measured by means of its audience share, 
retrieved from the European Audiovisual Observatory 2011 dataset.4  
Additionally, we control for left–right self-placement and political ambivalence, since 
previous research revealed that (US) conservative and liberal partisans show distinct patterns 
of exposure to consonant bias (Garrett & Stroud, 2014; Iyengar & Hahn, 2009), and 
extremism and strength of partisanship have been shown to affect exposure to cognitive 
dissonance to various extents and in different ways (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003; Jost, Glaser, 
Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Sidanius, 1985). Political ambivalence is operationalized for 
each individual as the difference between an individual’s first and second most preferred 
political party. The measure ranges from 0 to 10, with lower difference indicating greater 
political ambivalence (see Appendix A for further details).  
 Potentially confounding variables such as news media exposure are also considered. 
Those individuals who most frequently seek news also have more chances of watching or 
reading viewpoints different from their own (e.g., Sears & Freedman, 1967). It is plausible 
that rating higher in cross-cutting exposure is simply the result of consuming greater amounts 
of news information. We also include a 7-point scale additive index of political knowledge to 
control for those individuals who may engage in more cross-cutting news exposure because it 
is easier for them to process new information (Taber & Lodge, 2006). Further socio-
demographic variables such as education, age, and gender are included in our regression 
models. 
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Finally, our models also account for variations between countries in several 
dimensions. A majoritarian/proportional electoral system variable is coded following CSES 
(2005), where 1 represents a majoritarian system, 2 a mixed system, and 3 a proportional 
electoral system.5 Power-sharing electoral systems have been shown to increase discussion 
rates by mobilizing (citizens feel more represented and less alienated in those systems) and 
adding to citizens’ political sophistication (through parties that make huge efforts to 
differentiate themselves from their counterparts) (Nir, 2012a), and we expect a similar impact 
on exposure to deliberativeness in the media. We additionally account for a media system’s 
characteristics, namely media–party parallelism, as a potential predictor of cross-cutting 
exposure (Van Kempen, 2007), which we construct following Van Kempen’s methodological 
approach (2007) (See Appendix A). As Goldman and Mutz (2011) showed, levels of cross-
cutting exposure seem to be lower in systems where media outlets are differentiated along 
partisan lines and thereby facilitate self-selection of like-minded information.   
Results 
 Figure 1 summarizes average levels of cross-cutting news exposure for the three main 
newspapers and two major television news programs in the 28 media systems considered in 
this study (recall our level-2 sample gathers media systems, since we distinguish between 
Flanders and Wallonia).  Despite high between-country variability, the results show that 
people in each of the surveyed states frequently seek at least some cross-cutting news. XME 
scores high for EES respondents in Netherlands (M=1.14, SD=0.95), Slovenia (M=1.13, 
SD=0.74), Sweden (M=1.04, SD=0.58), and Slovakia (M=1.03, SD=0.72); and yields the 
lowest scores in the UK (M=0.41, SD=0.79), Latvia (M=0.42, SD=0.39), Estonia (M=0.44, 
SD=0.83), and Lithuania (M=0.44, SD=0.75).  
[Figure 1 about here] 
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 Other analyses demonstrate that the impact of political interest on cross-cutting 
exposure also varies across countries (not shown here). Overall, these results show the need 
to account for further contextual variables that explain significant gaps between countries in 
terms of cross-cutting news exposure levels, above and beyond individual differences in 
political interest.    
In Table 1, Models 1 to 4 uncover the individual and contextual contributions to 
cross-cutting news exposure. The random-intercept regression models are built on the 
following equations: 
XMEij = β0j+ β1Pol. Interestij+ β2Pol. Knowledgeij+ β3Pol. Ambivalenceij + 
β4NewsExposureij  + β5Left-Rightij + β6Ageij + β7Educationij + 
β8Femaleij + β9PSBstrenghtj Pol.Interestij + εij  
β0j = γ0 + γ1PSBstrenghtj + γ2ElectoralSystemj + γ3MPParallelismj + ζj     
Model 1 in Table 1 is a null model with no predictors, which allows assessment of the 
degree of variation of our dependent variable (XME) and how the model fit increases with 
the inclusion of independent variables in Model 2. Model 3 accounts for both individual-level 
and further media-system level controls, and Model 4 includes PSB strength and political 
interest as an interaction variable.   
The last two rows of Table 1 show the variance at the individual level (Level-1 
variance) and the variance of the intercept of XME across countries (Level-2 variance). The 
proportion of variance of XME that remains to be explained at both levels tends to decline 
across models. The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) decreases from the null model 
(where 10% of the unexplained variance remains at the media-system level) to Model 4 
(where unexplained variance drops to 7%). The decreases in Akaike’s information criterion 
(AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), which correct for the inclusion of 
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predictors, also confirm that the models fit the data better with the inclusion of additional 
variables (not shown in table). 
 The models reveal that political interest is positively linked to cross-cutting news 
media exposure, supporting our first hypothesis. An additional unit of political interest raises 
cross-cutting news media exposure by 0.03 on a 3-point scale. Similarly, a one-unit increase 
in public service broadcasting strength implies an increase of 0.006 in the cross-cutting news 
media exposure scale6.  
Therefore, as our second hypothesis proposed, the strength of public service 
broadcasting also adds to the likelihood of engaging in XME. As the table shows, the 
relationship holds even after taking into account alternative individual- and context-level 
explanations.  
[Table 1 about here] 
 Furthermore, we find support for the third hypothesis, in which we anticipate 
that the role of political interest is attenuated by PSB strength. The negative score for PSB 
strength by political interest cross-level interaction reported in Model 4 shows that the 
relevance of political interest for explaining XME decreases with stronger PSB. For each unit 
increase in the strength of PSB, the effect of political interest decreases by 0.002. For 
example, in Denmark, as the country with the highest PSB strength (60% of audience share), 
the expected impact of political interest on XME is -0.008; whereas for Luxembourg, where 
PSB strength scores 0 (no PSB), the predicted effect is 0.062.  
 The impact of political interest on cross-cutting news media exposure for different 
levels of PSB strength is further illustrated in Figure 2. The figure plots different regression 
slopes for political interest on cross-cutting news media exposure (or XME) for different 
levels of PSB audience share, i.e., at the mean, and ±1 standard deviation from the mean 
(Aiken and West, 1991). When PSB strength is held at the mean minus one standard 
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deviation, the slope is steeper than when PSB strength is one standard deviation above the 
mean, meaning that political interest is a less important predictor in systems with a stronger 
PSB than in countries with weaker PSB. Therefore, the disparities in cross-cutting news 
exposure, between more and less politically interested individuals, are narrower in media 
systems with stronger PSB than those with weaker PSB.   
[Figure 2 about here] 
Additionally, as anticipated, Table 1 shows that political knowledge and news media 
exposure are also positively linked to cross-cutting media exposure. Consistent with the 
previous literature (Sidanius, 1985), we found no significant relationship between political 
ambivalence and XME. Being strongly partisan—as opposed to being politically 
ambivalent—was not correlated with unwillingness to experience cognitive complexity 
through cross-cutting news media exposure. Also, right-wing Europeans seem to be exposed 
to more disagreement than left-wing individuals, unlike in the United States (Iyengar et al., 
2008). Higher levels of education and age correlate with high degrees of XME, whereas 
gender (being female) decreases the likelihood to engage in XME. The findings also 
corroborated the anticipated influence of the political system. Individuals living in countries 
with proportional electoral systems seem to encounter cross-cutting information in greater 
numbers. However, we could not find any significant impact of media–party parallelism on 
the likelihood of encountering disagreement through the media.   
Discussion 
 Research on news choice has devoted far more attention to the study of the 
antecedents and consequences of exposure to like-minded information than to the 
determinants of cross-cutting news media exposure. Whereas a thriving body of literature 
deals with exposure to diversity in political discussion (e.g., Esterling et al., 2015, Klofstad, 
Sokhey, & McClurg, 2013; Price et al., 2002), few studies have examined how media 
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landscape characteristics (Goldman and Mutz, 2011; Mutz & Martin, 2001) or individual 
predispositions (Garrett, 2009; Garrett & Stroud, 2014) explain exposure to news media 
outlets across lines of political difference. This omission is striking, given that the media are 
considered the main source of citizens’ information on political diversity, much more so than 
interpersonal communication (Chaffee, 1982; Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2011; Mutz & Martin, 
2001).  
 The present study investigates why people are exposed to cross-cutting information 
in news media. Two main factors are scrutinized: the impact of individual political interest, 
and the role of the media institutional context. We hypothesized that the contribution of 
political interest to XME is contingent on the strength of the public service broadcaster in a 
given society. More politically interested individuals are more motivated to follow current 
events and to seek oppositional views in order to fulfill their self-image of a well-informed 
citizen, and to be able to argue and counter-argue in future social interactions. However, 
individual predispositions play a weaker role in settings that provide greater access to 
politically diverse information. In that respect, PSB functions as an institutional moderator, 
and redistributes the opportunities for encountering political difference among more and less 
interested citizens. Our analyses support these hypotheses. The strength of both political 
interest and PSB increase the likelihood of non-likeminded news media exposure, and the 
impact of political interest is weaker in media systems where PSB is strong.  
 These findings have several theoretical implications. Firstly, they add to the previous 
literature on selectivity in media consumption by uncovering the role of citizens’ 
opportunities and motivations for cross-cutting news exposure in current media landscapes. 
Not only do media users search for like-mindedness, as the previous empirical literature 
shows for the US (Stroud, 2008, 2011), but they also seem to hold more heterogeneous media 
diets. Specifically, individuals with high political interest tend to search for uncongenial 
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information. However, media systems with strong PSB facilitate access to politically 
balanced news information, and spread standards of political diversity across media outlets. 
This increases the opportunities for less motivated individuals to encounter cross-cutting 
information without actively searching for it and have an equalizing effect on the level cross-
cutting exposure between more and less politically interested individuals. In this respect, our 
paper is inspired by systemic equalizer approaches (Iyengar et al., 2010; Nir, 2012b). Studies 
grounded in such tradition show that where media environments make information more 
accessible, there is less disparity in engagement and news exposure between citizens. Our 
findings thus complement cross-national studies showing that lower news media 
fragmentation (Nir, 2012b) and greater news reach (Sheahata & Strömbäck, 2011) provide 
citizens with abilities and motivations conducive to all forms of news media exposure. Our 
study also adds to the previous literature revealing that encountering disagreement in the 
media and social networks influences political engagement. As Torcal and Maldonado (2014) 
have shown, encountering mass media heterogeneity increases political interest. Following 
previous research showing reciprocal causation between political engagement and news 
media exposure (Strömbäck & Shehata, 2010), we may find a similar virtuous circle between 
political interest and exposure to non-likeminded news, or even a greater impact of news 
exposure on political interest than vice versa for outlets that require more user attention e.g. 
newspapers (see Boulianne, 2011).         
On that note, the analysis of longitudinal data could help identify the direction and 
strength of causality between both mechanisms. The high demands of collecting cross-
national panel survey and content data, or recalling experimental evidence, makes this task 
more suited for future research. Nevertheless, our findings across 27 countries offer 
generalizable evidence, and hold after both individual and contextual characteristics are taken 
into account. An important limitation of our analysis is its reliance on PSB market shares as 
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an indicator of PSB ability to spread standards of political balance and pluralism. For the sake 
of interpretation, we did not account for the market strength of PSB and the degree of 
institutional commitment of PSB in a single measure. However, we provided evidence that 
where PSB is stronger, news media coverage is more politically balanced. This sustains 
greater confidence that the influence of PSB strength on XME is not only due to the public 
service broadcasting’s role in reducing media fragmentation and opportunities for selective 
exposure, but also stems from its actual provision of more diverse content.  
Although relying on governmental evaluations allows for equivalent comparisons 
between individuals in various contexts, other measures of cross-cutting exposure might 
provide different results. Levels of selective exposure are sensitive to methodological 
choices, that is, to the use of political ideology vs. issue attitudes (Feldman, Stroud, Bimber 
& Wojcieszak, 2013). Others, however, showed no substantial differences between measures 
of selective exposure and avoidance, using either partisanship or issue position (Garrett & 
Stroud, 2014). Future research needs to address such incongruences and investigate whether 
the results shown here remain when using other methodological approaches, or when 
accounting for a larger amount of media outlets beyond the limited set of mainstream 
newspapers and TV channels considered in our study. 
 Further potential problems with our findings on the impact of PSB could be ruled out 
by means of statistical control. For example, it is possible that particularly high levels of 
media–party parallelism in certain media systems would have undermined the potential 
benefits of PSB strength on individual exposure to political difference. This possibility is 
conspicuous in polarized pluralist and corporatist media systems (Hallin & Mancini, 2004) as 
well as in new Central and Eastern European democracies, where advocacy traditions (e.g., 
for Germany) and high degrees of media politicization (e.g., for Bulgaria) make it easier for 
audiences to select news content along partisan lines, as reported in previous studies 
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(Goldman & Mutz, 2011). Our analyses on a larger country sample with more recent data 
revealed no significant negative impact of media–party parallelism on XME nor any 
influence on the PSB coefficient, when parallelism was included in the regression models7.   
 The deliberative nature of our dependent variable (XME) makes comparing media 
consumption and exposure to (online and offline) social networks a research avenue worth 
exploring. A fruitful direction for future studies would be to test whether PSB has the same 
explanatory power for exposure to disagreement on the Internet, where levels of partisanship 
and political homophily are shown to be high (Colleoni, Rozza, & Arvidsson, 2014; Garrett, 
2009; Mutz & Young, 2011). In online communication, as in interpersonal communication, 
people tend to be surrounded by like-minded others, thereby greatly limiting the potential for 
PSB to increase people’s likelihood to overcome lines of political difference (but see 
Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2011; Webster and Ksiazek, 2012 for the opposite argument, and 
Flaxman, Goel and Rao, 2016 for evidence for both sides of the debate). It would therefore be 
useful to test whether political interest plays a similar role in explaining XME through 
political discussion. Previous research suggests that heterogeneity in media and in 
interpersonal discussion have differential effects on political interest (Torcal & Maldonado, 
2014); and that, for the cross-cutting exposure in social interactions, further psychological 
mechanisms may be at work, such as fear of social accountability (Mutz, 2002b). Previous 
studies also show that political interest either increases selective exposure (Stroud, 2011) or 
significantly predicts exposure to both selective and cross-cutting views (Garrett, 2009). 
Further research should uncover under which conditions these two patterns of media 
exposure are intertwined, conflated, or do not converge at all. Finally, future research should 
investigate whether trends toward media market concentration in favor of commercial 
operators can also contribute to bridge deliberative gaps between citizens with different 
socio-economic backgrounds and/or political attitudes, as shown in this study for public TV 
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channels. Could competition hinder access to media pluralism and political diversity? 
Following spatial models that predict convergence to median brand locations (Downs, 1957; 
Hotelling, 1929), a strand of economic research has shown that media companies in highly 
concentrated markets tend to cater for larger (and by extension more heterogeneous) 
audiences than those in more fragmented markets (Mullainathan & Sheifer, 2005; Steiner, 
1952). Overall, we hope the present study paves the way for future research on how the 
structure of media markets might facilitate mutual understanding and equalize opportunities 
for pluralism via exposure to political views unlike one’s own.   
Notes 
1 For further details, see EES 2009 Media Study Data report in Schuck et al., 2010. 
2 We use random intercept regressions for the sake of parsimony and to avoid interpretation 
problems. First, we center our explanatory variables in order to better interpret the value of 
the coefficients of the two variables involved in the interaction term (after centering, the 
coefficient of each of those variables corresponds to its slope when the other variable is at its 
mean) and the intercept (which after centering is interpreted as the expected XME keeping 
the explanatory variables at their means). Had we used random slopes regressions –letting the 
slopes vary across countries- the value of the intercept would have changed with the shift of 
scale. Second, with multilevel interactions predicting slopes is more difficult than predicting 
intercepts, and if there is any measurement error in one of the variables in the interaction, the 
latter’s value risks lacking reliability (see Hox, 2010, pp.59-68).  
3 As the EES voter survey questionnaire only allows consideration of those individuals that 
either approve or disapprove of their government’s record, but not those who are ambivalent 
or indifferent, we conduct further regression analysis with an additional measure of cross-
cutting news exposure. The latter is built on the same formula described above. However, 
rather than relying on governmental evaluations as a proxy for individuals’ political 
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affections, we use the left–right self-placement of individuals and the average self-placement 
of the audiences of media outlets to which they are exposed on a weekly basis. The trends 
found with this latter measure are similar to those uncovered by the original analyses using 
our main measure of cross-cutting news media exposure (see Appendix D for results of 
additional analyses and robustness tests). 
4 For Wallonia and Flanders we used data from 2012 provided by the Munich Society for the 
Promotion of Economic Research (CESifo) at the University of Munich, retrieved from 
https://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/facts/DICE/Infrastructure/Communication-
Networks/Regulation/Public-Service-Broadcasting--An-International-
Comparison/fileBinary/Public-Service-Broadcasting_dicereport314-db1.pdf 
5 For Estonia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Austria and Slovakia, data were retrieved from Colomer 
(2004); for Cyprus, Malta, and Luxembourg, as reported in official sites of the country’s 
parliament (for Cyprus, accessed on 12.09.2016), and governments (for Malta, 12.09.2016, 
and for Luxembourg, 13.09.2016). 
6 Further robustness checks where PSB strength is correlated to a measure of one-sidedness in 
news coverage per country provided support to the assumption that public media create 
opportunity structures to cross-select political information. Where PSB audience share is 
higher, media outlets grant a more proportionate visibility to parties as compared to their 
voting share (Pearson’s r =-.274, p=.005, confidence intervals=-.391, -.153, N=24). In line 
with our theoretical expectations, PSB standards seem to spill-over commercial media.  
7 As an additional robustness check, we ran regressions with a dummy variable: countries in 
which there is governmental control over PSBs (i.e. polarized-pluralist countries and post-
communist democracies =1) and the rest of the countries (=0). Results confirmed the same 
patterns found in the original models we report, providing support for our hypotheses. 
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Tables and Figures 
               Figure 1: Average Level of Cross-Cutting News Exposure in 28 EU Media Systems 
 
Note: For country abbreviations, we used ISO 3166-1 Alpha-2 codes. 
Table 1: Random-intercept Regression Models of Cross-Cutting News Media Exposure by 
Political Interest 
 
B SE B SE B SE B SE
Political interest 0.026*** 0.006 0.026*** 0.006 0.025*** 0.006
Political knowledge 0.009** 0.003 0.009** 0.003 0.090** 0.003
Political ambivalence -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002
News media exposure 0.019*** 0.003 0.019*** 0.003 0.019*** 0.003
Left-right self-placement (rightist) 0.016*** 0.002 0.016*** 0.002 0.015*** 0.002
Age 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000
Level of education 0.011** 0.004 0.011** 0.004 0.011** 0.004
Female -0.030*** 0.009 -0.030*** 0.009 -0.031*** 0.009
PSB strength 0.006* 0.002 0.006* 0.002
PSB strength*Political interest -0.002*** 0.000
Electoral system (Proportional) 0.155** 0.056 0.155** 0.056
Media-party parallelism -0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.005
constant 0.794*** 0.041 0.805*** 0.041 0.804*** 0.034 0.806*** 0.034
N  (level 1) 21,068 21,068 21,068 21,068
N (level 2) 28 28 28 28
Variance level 1 ( σ²) 0.404*** 0.396*** 0.396*** 0.396***
Variance level 2 (τ00) 0.047*** 0.045*** 0.031*** 0.031***
Log likelihood -20407.07 -20204.73 -20199.60 -20189.84
Note.  Table reports unstandardized coefficients from random-intercept regression models.* p< 0.05; ** p< 0.01; *** p<0.001 (two-tailed).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
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Figure 2:  Marginal Effect of Political Interest on Cross-Cutting News Media Exposure, by 
Public Service Broadcasting Strength 
 
Note. Data from multilevel models, see Table 1 (model 4). Strong PSB attenuates the differences between the 
more and less engaged, in cross-cutting exposure to different views. 
 
Appendices  
Appendix A 
Question wording and coding of variables:   
Government evaluation: 
Do you approve or disapprove of the government’s record to date? -1=disapprove,1=approve. 
Exposure to specific news programs/newspapers: 
In a typical week, how many days do you watch the following news programs/do you read 
the following newspapers? 0=0 days, 1=1-7 days a week 
Political interest:  
To what extent are you interested in politics? (4-point scale). 
Political knowledge (additive index):  
Switzerland is a member of the EU 
The European Union has 25 member states 
.6
.7
.8
.9
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
le
ve
ls
 o
f c
ro
ss
-c
ut
tin
g 
ex
po
su
re
not at all very
To what extent are you interested in politics
Weak PSB Medium PSB
Strong PSB
 
 
32 
Every country in the EU elects the same number of representatives to the European 
Parliament 
Every six months a different Member State becomes president of the Council of the EU 
(0-6 multiple choice with one-true options and DK. Correct answer 1 point) 
Political ambivalence: 
The difference between the first most preferred and the second most preferred party 
preference (i.e. the two highest scores reported to the question: How probable is it that you 
will ever vote for the following parties? 0 = “not at all”, 10, =“very probable”) is computed as 
each individual’s level of political ambivalence, ranging from 0 to 10. This difference is 
subtracted from 10 so that the higher the indicator scores, the higher the level of ambivalence. 
News media exposure:  
In a typical week, how many days do you follow the news? (0-7). 
Left-right self-placement:  
In political matters people talk of “the left” and “the right”. What is your position? (0=left, 
10=right). 
Level of education: 
What is the highest level of education you have completed? (0-6) 
Media-party parallelism: 
The probability to vote for a given party of EES 2009 respondents is regressed on each 
individual’s frequency of use of the two TV channels and three newspapers of each media 
system. The resulting adjusted R2 accounts for the degree of variance of party preference 
explained by media use patterns. Each party’s adjusted R2 score is finally weighted according 
to its voting share and summed up to the rest of parties’ adjusted R2 values to obtain a score 
of media-party parallelism at the media system level. 
Appendix B 
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Calculation of Cross-cutting News Media Exposure (XME) 
 For each individual i,  
 
where αi indicates each individual’s i  evaluation of the government, and βj is the average 
government’s evaluation by media outlet j. δi(j) = 1 if individual i is exposed to media outlet j 
and δi(j) = 0 otherwise. The resulting equation computes the distance between one’s own 
evaluation of the government and the positive/negative governmental evaluation by the media 
he or she is exposed to, divided by the number of media outlets this individual uses on a 
weekly basis. Examples of possible scores for a given individual and a given media outlet are 
the following: 
 
| (-1) – (-1) | = 0  (when an individual disapproves the government record and 
   the media outlet they use too). 
| (-1) – 0 | = | -1 | = 1 (when an individual disapproves the government record and the 
   media outlet they use hold mixed/balanced views). 
| (-1) – 1 | = | -2 | = 2 (when an individual disapproves the government record and 
   the media outlet they use approves it). 
| 1 – 1 | = 0    (when an individual approves the government record and the 
   media outlet they use too). 
| 1 – 0 | = 1   (when an individual approves the government record and the 
   media outlet they use hold mixed/balanced views). 
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| 1 – (-1) | = 2    (when an individual approves the government record and the 
   media outlet they use  disapproves it). 
Appendix C 
 
 
 
Appendix D 
Additional regression models with a second variable of cross-cutting media exposure and 
further controls 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variable N Min Max Mean SD Variance
XME 21068 0 2 0.799 0.674 0.455
Political interest 21068 1 4 2.648 0.868 0.753
Political knowledge 21068 0 6 3.651 1.616 2.610
Political ambivalence 21068 0 10 7.105 3.011 9.067
News media exposure 21068 0 7 6.057 1.744 3.040
Left-right self-placement 21068 0 10 5.323 2.745 7.533
Age 21068 18 95 50.352 16.652 277.302
Level of education 21068 0 6 3.541 1.368 1.871
Female 21068 0 1 0.538 0.499 0.249
Table 3: Variance-Covariance Matrix
Variable XME Pol. interest Pol. knowledge Pol. ambivalence News media exposure Rightist Age Level of education Female
XME 0.455
Political interest 0.049 0.753
Political knowledge 0.092 0.434 2'610
Political ambivalence -0.011 -0.190 -0.629 9'067
News media exposure 0.115 0.403 0.494 -0.212 3'040
Rightist 0.091 -0.034 -0.041 -0.270 0.114 7'533
Age 1'043 1'942 3'197 -6.370 8'667 2'147 277'302
Level of education 0.208 0.198 0.482 0.402 0.042 0.425 -4.322 1'871
Female -0.015 -0.054 -0.159 -0.006 -0.024 -0.002 0.248 -0.012 0.249
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Additional variables accounting for individual exposure to media’s political diversity, both 
within- and between- each media outlet, are computed and included as control variables in 
further regression models in the following. As one reviewer highlighted, and the regression 
models confirm, the greater the levels of exposure to diverse viewpoints in the media, the 
higher the likelihood of encountering uncongenial views.  
Within-outlet diversity (or WOD) was constructed for each individual i as follows: 
 
where  σj indicates the standard deviation of government’s evaluation by each media outlet j 
that individual i uses (δi(j) = 1 if individual i is exposed to media outlet j and δi(j) = 0 
otherwise). The resulting scores of the measure stand for the average dispersion of the 
distribution of viewpoints (i.e. government’s evaluation) within each media outlet an 
individual uses on a weekly basis. 
B SE B SE B SE B SE
Political interest 0.250*** 0.014 0.251*** 0.014 0.250*** 0.014
Political knowledge -0.042*** 0.007 -0.042*** 0.007 -0.042*** 0.007
Political ambivalence -0.073*** 0.004 -0.073*** 0.004 -0.073*** 0.004
News media exposure 0.065*** 0.007 0.065*** 0.007 0.065*** 0.007
Left-right self-placement (rightist) -0.039*** 0.004 -0.039*** 0.004 -0.039*** 0.004
Age 0.006*** 0.001 0.006*** 0.001 0.006*** 0.001
Level of education -0.079*** 0.009 -0.079*** 0.009 -0.079*** 0.009
Female 0.041 0.022 0.041 0.022 0.040 0.022
PSB strength -0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.004
PSB strength*Political interest -0.002* 0.001
Electoral system (Proportional) 0.122 0.093 0.123 0.093
Media-party parallelism 0.011 0.008 0.011 0.008
constant 1.925*** 0.065 1.886*** 0.061 1.888*** 0.057 1.890*** 0.057
N  (level 1) 22,593 22,593 22,593 22,593
N (level 2) 28 28 28 28
Variance level 1 ( σ²) 2.718*** 2.551*** 2.551*** 2.550***
Variance level 2 (τ00) 0.116*** 0.096*** 0.083*** 0.085***
Log likelihood -43401.403 -42684.49 -42682.59 -42680.226
Table 4: Random-intercept regression models with a second measure of cross-cutting news media exposure (along left-right scale) by 
political interest
Note.  Table reports unstandardized coefficients from random-intercept regression models.* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 (two-tailed).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
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Between-outlet diversity (or BOD) was constructed for each individual i as follows: 
  
where βj is the average government’s evaluation by media outlet j and  x̅i indicates the 
average government’s evaluation of individual i’s media diet. δi(j) = 1 if individual i is 
exposed to media outlet j and δi(j) = 0 otherwise.  The resulting equation computes the 
standard deviation of the average government’s evaluation of all the media outlets an 
individual uses at least once a week. 
 
 
 
B SE B SE B SE B SE
Political interest 0.013* 0.006 0.013* 0.006 0.013* 0.006
Political knowledge 0.045 0.003 0.045 0.003 0.048 0.003
Political ambivalence -0.004* 0.002 -0.004* 0.002 -0.004* 0.002
News media exposure -0.006 0.003 -0.006 0.003 -0.006 0.003
Left-right self-placement (rightist) 0.015*** 0.002 0.015*** 0.002 0.015*** 0.002
Age 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000
Level of education 0.014*** 0.004 0.014*** 0.004 0.014*** 0.004
Female -0.031*** 0.009 -0.031*** 0.009 -0.031*** 0.009
Within-outlet diversity exposure 0.297*** 0.025 0.295*** 0.025 0.298*** 0.025
Between-outlet diversity exposure 0.075* 0.034 0.076* 0.034 0.073* 0.034
PSB strength 0.007* 0.003 0.007** 0.003
PSB strength*Political interest -0.002*** 0.000
Electoral system (Proportional) 0.096 0.059 0.096 0.059
Media-party parallelism -0.002 0.005 -0.002 0.005
constant 0.861*** 0.042 0.858*** 0.041 0.857*** 0.036 0.859*** 0.036
N  (level 1) 19,336 19,336 19,336 19,336
N (level 2) 28 28 28 28
Variance level 1 ( σ²) 0.381*** 0.374*** 0.374*** 0.373***
Variance level 2 (τ00) 0.048*** 0.045*** 0.034*** 0.034***
Log likelihood -18174.44 -17984.33 -17980.52 -17970.27
Note.  Table reports unstandardized coefficients from random-intercept regression models.* p<0.05; ** p< 0.01; *** p< 0.001 (two-tailed).
Table 5: Random-intercept regression models of cross-cutting news media exposure by political interest (with within- and between-outlet 
diversity controls)
Model 1c Model 2c Model 3c Model 4c
